Chapter 9 Where to Go?─The International Crisis of Taiwan and Taiwan-China Relations

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After the conclusion of World War II in 1945, the ROC’s status in the international community was at its peak, in particular due to its being one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. With the Nationalists’ defeat by the Communists in the Chinese Civil War and their subsequent retreat to Taiwan in 1949, as well as the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, which also claimed to represent all of China, in Beijing on October 1 of that year, the entire situation began to change gradually. The period of changes can be divided into three stages: favorable, adverse, and co-existent. In the favorable stage (1949-1971), the ROC continued to represent all of China in the UN and adhered to a strict policy of “gentlemen won’t stand with thieves,” repulsing the dual recognition of the ROC and the PRC, and was recognized by a majority of the world nations. The adverse stage (1972-1987) began late in 1971 when the UN passed a resolution stating that the PRC was the sole representative of China. In light of the PRC’s effective control of the mainland and increasing power, the international community also increasingly identified the PRC as the only representative of China. The ROC’s international status declined even further and the country began to sink into isolation. The co-existent stage (1988 to present) began with Lee Teng-hui’s ascension to the presidency in 1988, and his promotion of a policy of co-existence between Taiwan and China in order to break Taiwan’s isolation. This struggle is far from over, however.

The Favorable Stage (1949-1971): “Gentlemen Won’t Stand with Thieves” and China Representation

Taipei became the government’s wartime capital following the ROC’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949, while all national policies were directed at retaking the mainland. At that time, the ROC adopted a policy of “gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” and labeled the PRC as an illegal regime.

During this early period, owing to the eruption of the Korean War in 1950, the UN viewed the PRC as having invaded Korea, and the United States and the PRC were in a state of war. With the announcement of a Korean War ceasefire, the international situation switched to confrontation between the free world and the communist bloc. This was favorable to the KMT government and helped ensure the ROC’s right to represent all of China.

The Nationalist government’s goal of recovering the mainland and reunifying China was not achieved during this time, however, while the PRC, on the contrary, was consolidating its rule over the mainland. Considering itself to be the sole legitimate representative of China, the PRC began to attack and isolate the ROC on the diplomatic front, gradually weakening the legal base and legitimacy of ROC’s right to represent China.

The PRC was formally established on October 1, 1949. On November 15 of that same year, China’s premier, Zhou Enlai (周恩來), delivered a statement to UN Secretary-General Trygve Halvdan Lie and President of the General Assembly Carlos P. Romulo. This expressed the view that the PRC was the sole legitimate representative of China and requested the cancellation of all ROC’s rights at the UN. On November 25, when the ROC was presenting its case regarding the Soviet Union’s invasion of China before the UN Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Y. Vyshinsky countered by calling for the replacement of the ROC with the PRC as the sole representative of China, thus starting the long controversy over who was the rightful representative. On January 8, 1950, the PRC asked the UN secretary-general and members of the Security Council for the right to represent China in the UN and all of its organizations. Two days later, Soviet Ambassador Lacob Malik submitted a formal proposal at the 459th meeting of the Security Council calling for the immediate expulsion of the ROC delegation, marking the opening salvo in the issue of China representation at the UN. On January 20, the PRC Foreign Ministry informed the UN secretary-general, the UN Security Council, and all members of the UN that the PRC delegation had already been sent to the UN, and inquired when the ROC delegation would be expelled.

With the eruption of the Korean War in May 1950, the US faced down the PRC, the ROC’s crisis was reduced temporarily, and the UN Security Council vetoed a Soviet proposal to accept the PRC and expel the ROC. On September 19, 1950, the 5^th session of the UN General Assembly passed a resolution asking a seven-country committee that included Canada, India, and the Philippines to study the issue of China’s UN representation. On October 16, 1950, the case was shelved at the recommendation of the Philippine delegation.

On November 6, 1951, at the 6^th session of the UN General Assembly held in Paris, the Soviet delegation suggested the issue of China representation be listed on the agenda. Four days later on November 10, however, while the General Committee was still reviewing the Soviet proposal, the Thai delegation requested a deferral, adding that any plan to accept the PRC into the UN at the expense of the ROC was simply unacceptable. Thus began the period of postponement, which lasted until 1960 and eliminated the ROC’s crisis by constantly deferring the issue of China’s representation in the UN for a variety of different reasons.

With the end of the Korean War, however, confrontation between East and West abated, which was disadvantageous to the ROC’s claim of representing all of China. Originally, admission of nations to UN membership was selective. When the principle of universality of membership was adopted in the UN’s handling of its membership application from 1955 onwards, however, the PRC became entitled to request UN membership. The issue had become too difficult to be relegated to whether the PRC or ROC should be the sole legal government of China. In 1961, both Mongolia and Mauritania planned to join the UN. Although the ROC wanted to use its veto power to prevent Mongolia from joining, the US persuaded the ROC not to and, in exchange, the US had the issue of China’s representation changed from “deferred” status to “an important issue” for future discussion, thus ensuring the ROC’s membership in the UN. In other words, the only way for the General Assembly to vote the ROC out of the UN would be to obtain a two-thirds vote in accordance with the provision of Chapter 18 of the Charter of the United Nations.

In the 1960s, the US position on the issue of China representation changed so that it would allow the PRC to become a member of the UN only if the ROC could maintain its seat. Although the US continuously worked to persuade the ROC to accept this system of dual representation, which was supported by most UN members, President Chiang Kai-shek would not budge from his principle that “gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” and adamantly refused to co-exist with the PRC. For its part, the PRC pressed further on this issue, continuing to express that it was the sole, legitimate representative of China. On September 29, 1965, PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi (陳毅) stated that even if the UN General Assembly expelled the ROC and instated the PRC as the legitimate representative of China at the UN, the PRC would refuse to be a part of the world body unless the UN underwent a complete reformation first.

Since both the ROC and the PRC insisted on representing China solely, the international community was forced to choose between the two. Given the PRC’s continuous and effective rule of the mainland, most countries began to recognize the PRC as representing all of China. On November 20, 1970, the right to represent China was voted on “as an important question” at the 25^th session of the UN General Assembly. The voting was extremely close, with the US proposal of allowing the ROC to keep its UN membership receiving just two votes less than the Albanian proposal of accepting the PRC and expelling the ROC, thus failing to meet the two-thirds requirement. Although the closeness of the vote symbolized how precarious the ROC’s position had become, President Chiang Kai-shek obstinately refused to compromise and continued to order Foreign Minister Wei Dao-ming (魏道明) to announce that the ROC’s policy of “gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” remained unchanged. Aside from being completely out of sync with international reality, this policy was also not in the national interests of the United States. Consequently, the US’s policy on China began to change rapidly under the orchestration of Henry Kissinger, the US national security advisor to President Nixon.

On October 20, 1971, on the eve of the UN General Assembly’s next session, Kissinger flew to Beijing to meet with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai. Several countries that had originally supported dual representation then began to change their attitude. Five days later, as expected, the UN General Assembly passed the Albanian proposal by a vote of 76 to 35, with 17 abstentions. The PRC thus replaced the ROC’s UN seat for representation of China. During the voting process, the ROC delegation announced the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN and left.

This setback, the largest ever faced by the Nationalist governments since its move to Taiwan, not only signified a formal end to President Chiang Kai-shek’s aspirations to retake the mainland and reunify China, but also marked the start of the issue of survival in Taiwan for the KMT regime. On October 26, 1971, President Chiang delivered an address on ROC’s withdrawal from the UN, urging citizens to support the government, and to “maintain composure during these times of adverse change and remain firmly dignified and vigorously self-reliant.”

As for Taiwan-China relations during this period, mutual hostilities continued and occasionally escalated into more intense crises, including vigorous attacks and battles in the Taiwan Strait. The first such crisis occurred between 1954 and 1955. On August 1, 1954, Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Zhu De (朱德) announced that he was “liberating Taiwan” (解放臺灣) and, on September 3, began artillery bombardment of Kinmen. The US, which supported the defense of Taiwan and Penghu but was opposed to stationing military personnel on Kinmen, Matsu, or any of the other smaller offshore islets, was worried about the situation and debated how deeply it wanted to get involved in this battle. To resolve its standpoint on dealing with Taiwan-China conflicts, the US signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty (中美共同防禦條約) with Taiwan on December 2, 1954, explicitly stating that the US would only defend Taiwan and Penghu. Thus, when the PLA attacked the Dachen Islands (大陳島) and occupied Ichiangshan (一江山 ) on January 10, 1955, the US avoided directly engaging with PRC forces in battle and, instead, adhered to a policy of assisting ROC’s forces to evacuate the island.

The second military crisis in the Taiwan Strait was the 823 Cannon War, which began without precedence on the afternoon of August 23, 1958, following a sudden announcement by the PRC that it was “determined to liberate Taiwan and other offshore islands, as well as land forces on Kinmen in the near future.” Although the US was not involved in this battle, it did send vessels to the region to safeguard supplies and provide new weapons to ROC’s forces. The PRC was eventually forced to abandon its attack. On October 23, the US signed a joint communiqué with the ROC government in which it recognized Kinmen and Matsu as areas it would help to defend alongside Taiwan and Penghu, while the ROC promised that it would seek the unification of China in accordance with the Three Principles of the People as opposed to using military means, and give up on its ambitions of retaking the mainland by force.

In 1961, just after US President Kennedy had taken office, the US basic stance was of advocating peaceful co-existence, with China on one side and Taiwan on the other. Consequently, the US began making plans for Taiwan to become the Democratic State of China-Taiwan. In the face of strong objections from both the ROC and PRC governments, however, this project was cancelled, leaving the hostile situation in the Taiwan Strait unresolved.

The Rise of the PRC in International Arena and the Dilemma of “One China” Policy (1972-1987)

The ROC’s withdrawal from the UN was the greatest crisis ever faced by the government since its move to Taiwan. In 1979, it was dealt another harsh blow when the US cut ties in order to establish formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. Despite being buffeted by a sea of difficulties, however, the Chiang regime continued to weather the storm all the way through 1988, when political power was peacefully transferred into Taiwan-born hands, which, undeniably, was an exceptional feat among authoritarian systems. During this period, there were three major competing forces in operation: the Nationalist government and its clique of unification advocates; the nativists; and the Communists.

After the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN at the end of 1971, the ROC’s international situation began to deteriorate rapidly as one country after another began to recognize the PRC as being the sole representative of China. Among these, most crucial was the United States, ROC’s long-term ally and supporter. On November 30, 1971, the PRC and US simultaneously announced that US President Richard Nixon would make a state visit to China. On February 21, 1972, President Nixon went to China to meet with Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong and hold discussions with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai. Six days later, the two sides signed the Shanghai Communiqué, in which the most important point was that “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either part of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” The US and PRC then headed toward the eventual establishment of formal relations.

On December 15, 1978, just when supplementary elections for members of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly were about to be held in Taiwan, US President Jimmy Carter suddenly announced that the United States would establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China on January 1, 1979, and abrogate the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty on December 31, 1979. These proclamations struck the ROC like lightning bolts, as the loss of the US as its long-term ally and supporter left the Nationalist government almost completely isolated in international politics.

Despite this change, however, the US was still very sympathetic to the Taiwanese people’s situation and strongly opposed to both communism and dictatorships. From start to finish, therefore, the US never made any definite proclamation on the future of Taiwan, and insisted that the cross-strait issue be resolved in a peaceful manner that fully respected the wishes of the people on Taiwan. Immediately after severing formal relations with the ROC government, the US drafted legislation to ensure the safety of Taiwan and continue supplying the island with defensive weapons to counter the PRC’s military threat. This legislation, known as the Taiwan Relations Act (臺灣關係法; TRA), was signed into law by US President Carter on April 10, 1979, and governed future unofficial relations with Taiwan in the absence of formal ties. The US promised to abide by and put into practice every article in the TRA. On February 28, 1983, the US Senate passed a resolution on Taiwan that declared: “The future of Taiwan should be resolved peacefully, in a form acceptable to the people of Taiwan that is free from coercive means and consistent with the spirit of the bill passed by Congress and the US-PRC Communiqué.” In other words, the US was using “strategic ambiguity” (戰略性的模糊) in dealing with the problematic question of “one China” and leaving more time and maneuvering room for future changes.

The ROC’s various foreign affairs setbacks greatly affected the nativists and unification advocates, both of whom were eagerly seeking a way out for Taiwan. Independence advocates living overseas began to accelerate their activities, moving back to the island to collaborate with nativists in promoting democratization and the independence movement. The Nationalist government, under the directions of Chiang Ching-kuo, also strategically manipulated the situation to protect its power. On February 22, 1972, following the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN, Koo Kuang-ming (辜寬敏), an executive member of the Japan-based World United Formosans for Independence (臺灣獨立聯盟; WUFI), immediately left the organization’s headquarters in Japan and returned to Taiwan to help save the country from national crisis. On April 2, Kyu Yeong-hann (邱永漢), a member of the central committee of the Taiwan Youth Independence Union (臺灣青年獨立聯盟; TIU), also returned from its Japanese headquarters to Taiwan to celebrate Chiang Kai-shek’s success in being reelected to a fifth term as president and to implement plans for investing in and setting up a factory in Taiwan. In addition, many other individuals blacklisted from entering Taiwan were finding different ways of returning to the island, each hoping to fulfill the dream of establishing an independent Taiwan. This heightened the sense of crisis felt by those in favor of unification, some of whom reacted by striking out at independence advocates, while increasing numbers of others laid their hopes for unification on the Chinese communists. Consequently, conflicts between unification and independence advocates became increasingly intense and visible, adding chaos to the future domestic political scene.

In foreign affairs, the Nationalist government’s long-term policy of “gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” had to be modified gradually for the ROC to survive. The most important change of international policy was the tacit consent of dual recognition; domestically, it was the acceptance of Unifying China Under the Three Principles of the People, and replacing the hostile mentality of Retaking the Mainland by Force with one of Peaceful Future Unification. Antagonism toward the Chinese communists began to soften.

On May 20, 1984, Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui were sworn into office as the seventh-term president and vice president. On October 15, 1986, the KMT’s central standing committee passed a proposal to end the Emergency Decree, which was lifted on July 15, 1987, followed by lifting of the ban on visiting relatives on the mainland. These moves symbolized a softening in Taiwan’s hostile attitude toward China.

At the same time, China ceased all substantial military actions against Taiwan and, instead, opted to use its “one-China” principle to establish diplomatic ties with other countries so as to isolate the ROC in the international arena. The PRC was largely successful with this policy.

Adoption and Predicament of the “Co-existence” Policy on Taiwan-China Relations (1988-present)

Chiang Ching-kuo passed away suddenly on January 13, 1988, leaving Vice President Lee Teng-hui to succeed him as president. Lee was subsequently elected to the post of KMT chairman on July 8 of the same year; re-elected as the eighth-term president of the ROC in 1990; and became the first ROC president to be elected by direct popular vote in 1996. Lee’s term in office as president spanned 12 years, from 1988 to 2000. Lee Teng-hui was Taiwan’s first head of state of local origin, and thus his presidency carried special historical significance, symbolizing the localization of an alien regime. Lee’s long term in power carried substantive meaning for two additional reasons. Firstly, because Lee was in office for 12 years, he had sufficient time to establish authority and implement his ideals. Secondly, Lee’s unique background, having lived through two alien regimes (Japanese rule and the ROC government) and his membership of the intellectual elite whose education included Japanese, Chinese, and American cultures, gave him a unique perspective of Taiwan-China relations. Accordingly, foreign policy and cross-strait relations underwent many fundamental changes under his reign.

Lee’s new policies can be largely summarized as follows: Domestically, he espoused the “New Taiwanese” (新臺灣人) identity to resolve problems of ethnic confrontation and consolidate the island into a “organismic community” (生命共同體), in the hope that Taiwan could eventually establish itself as an independent state. Internationally, he abandoned the old “gentlemen won’t stand with thieves” credo of the KMT and promoted “pragmatic diplomacy” (務實外交); gradually adopted a more open policy toward China; and shifted from the vague theory of “future unification” (未來統一論) to the clearer “state-to-state” theory (兩國論).

In his inaugural address on May 20, 1990, President Lee Teng-hui vowed to terminate the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, amend the Constitution within two years, and communicate with China over the issue of unification on an equal footing. On May 1, 1991, he officially announced the termination of the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, claiming “the mainland is now under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Communists, and this is a fact that we must face.” In addition to signifying that Taiwan was no longer in a state of confrontation with the Chinese Communist Party, this announcement acknowledged the concurrent “existence of two political entities” (政治實體的存在) across the Taiwan Strait. In 1991, elections were held to replace the entire National Assembly. In 1994, the Constitution was amended again, with the Additional Articles stipulating that, henceforth, the ROC president would be directly elected via popular vote, beginning with the 1996 election. By this stage, it was apparent that, at a constitutional level, Taiwan was a sovereign state.

On the other hand, Lee’s efforts to promote negotiations with China were yielding little progress due to the fact that the “one-China” issue remained unresolved. To end this stalemate, Lee guided the establishment of several agencies for commencing negotiations with China, such as the National Unification Council (國家統一委員會), the Straits Exchange Foundation (海峽兩岸基金會; SEF), and the Mainland Affairs Council (大陸工作委員會; MAC). The event that drew the most attention was undoubtedly the discussions held on April 27-29, 1993, in Singapore between the SEF and its mainland China counterpart, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (海峽兩岸關係協會; ARATS). At these talks, dubbed the “Icebreaking Tour,” (破冰之旅), then SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫) and ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan (汪道涵) reached consensus on four points. The critical issue of “one China” remained unresolved, however, and what progress was made was later offset by other setbacks. Consequently, Taiwan-China relations remained in a quagmire.

President Lee Teng-hui was well aware that to achieve breakthroughs in foreign relations, Taiwan needed to reach out and make the world aware of its existence. He therefore took every opportunity to travel abroad on state visits including Singapore between March 5 and 9, 1989, when Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew (李光耀) introduced him as the “President from Taiwan.” Throughout the 1990s, Lee continued to carry out his “vacation diplomacy” (渡假外交), leaving footprints in the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas. The most influential of these trips was undeniably the 1995 visit to his alma mater in the US, Cornell University. This visit not only triggered a series of verbal attacks and military threats from Beijing, bringing cross-strait relations to a new low, but also prompted China to carry out large-scale military exercises and fire missiles into Taiwan’s waters during the ROC presidential election of March 1996. The situation became extremely intense. Fortunately, the US placed two aircraft carriers on alert in the waters near Taiwan, and the crisis ended without any real danger.

Furthermore, from 1993 onward, Taiwan began to seek re-admission to the United Nations. No progress has been achieved to date, however, due to constant interference from China. In 1999, just before ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan’s first visit to Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui openly defined Taiwan-China relations as a “special state-to-state relationship” (特殊兩國論). This evoked strong protests and condemnation from China, resulted in the cancellation of Wang’s trip, and caused cross-strait relations to deteriorate.

DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian was victorious in the 2000 ROC presidential election. In his inaugural address, Chen took into account the threat from China and the stance of opposition forces on the island by proposing a “Five Noes” (四不一沒有) policy that included a vow not to actively seek independence for Taiwan. China did not trust Chen, however, and adopted a “listen and watch” (聽其言，觀其行) policy, maintaining a high profile in the international community, and suppressing the ROC president whenever possible so as to prevent him from deviating from his declared position. Meanwhile, opposition parties in Taiwan repeatedly criticized Chen’s policies, putting him under attack from both internal and external forces. Despite these pressures, Chen managed to maintain a low profile while constantly expressing goodwill gestures to China. China did not respond with any positive signs of its own, however. In August 2002, Chen suddenly announced his theory that there was “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” (一邊一國論). This evoked strong criticism from both Beijing and domestic pro-unification forces. Given that Taiwan is autonomic and democratic while communist China emphasizes nationalism, and the two sides are therefore mutually exclusive, it is clear that it will be difficult to reduce tensions in cross-strait confrontations.

Although there is still no solution to the political problems facing Taiwan and China, economic and people-to-people exchanges between the two sides have continued to increase. Taiwan businesses have also invested heavily in China, contributing much to the rapid growth of China’s economy and allowing it to supplant the US as Taiwan’s largest export destination. The annual number of Taiwanese tourists visiting China has also grown dramatically, greatly contributing to China’s development.

In sum, Taiwan has already adopted a pragmatic policy that supports the co-existence of the two sides. Owing to internal conflicts among different social groups and external threats from the PRC, however, Taiwan is still unable to participate in the international community with the status of a sovereign state. Whether or not Taiwan can free itself from this straitjacket remains to be seen.
 

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