 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
|||||
|
 |
 |
Chapter 8 The First Democracy in the Chinese World: The Kaohsiung Incident and Taiwan’s “Political Miracle” |
|
 BackNext
|
As mentioned above, struggles between the government and Taiwanese society began to surface from the early 1970s onwards. Distrusts and tensions between the two sides further exacerbated after the US President Carter’s announced that the US would recognize the People’s Republic of China as the Chinese government on January 1, 1979 and thus severed the formal ties with Taiwan in December 1978. Generally speaking, the KMT’s strategy in handling the situation was to use punishment as a warning so as to “kill flowers before they bud.” The dangwai (dissidents) counteracted with intensifying confrontations, including demonstrations against martial law, and thus led to the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979 in the end. This incident could have become another February 28 Incident for the KMT to withstand the democracy movement after suppression. Contrary to anticipations by some KMT officials, it led to the peaceful and progressive birth of the first democracy in the Chinese world as changes at home and abroad forced the government and dangwai to compromise. This evolutionary process is summarized in the following sections covering the Kaohsiung Incident, abolition of martial law, and democratization.The Kaohsiung Incident
After the United States announced its severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the KMT continued its long-established implementation of carrot-and-stick policies. Thus, on the one hand, it promoted the step-by-step piecemeal democracy to ease Taiwanese antagonism via supplementary elections and partial re-elections for members of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan, as well as limited appointments of high officials for the Taiwanese, while on the other, it tightened controls on dissidents. The Yu Deng-fa case (余登發) was a good example.
On January 1, 1979, the US terminated its formal relations with Taiwan. On January 21, former Kaohsiung County Magistrate Yu Deng-fa and his son, Yu Ruei-yan (余瑞言), were detained by the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters (TGGH) pending an investigation of their suspected involvement with Wu Chun-fa (吳春發), or Wu Tai-an (吳泰安). This incident occurred with great suddenness and suspicion. It was widely believed that Wu Chun-fa was an informant for an intelligence body and was being used to trap the father and son. Yu Deng-fa was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment on April 26, while Wu was executed before he could say anything.
Yu Deng-fa was persecuted because of his tough stance toward the government while serving as magistrate, which threatened the KMT’s vested interests. For instance, Yu had cut the county budget for the KMT’s grassroots organizations and prohibited KMT members of the county government from scheduling party meetings during office hours. Although in essence Yu Deng-fa’s political ideals were quite dissimilar to those of the dangwai (he was a staunch Sino centrist and against Taiwan independence, for example), the dangwai felt threatened by the government’s persecution of Yu and took it as a warning of further repression. Thus, to curb abuses by the security and intelligence agencies, various members of the dangwai including Huang Hsin-chieh (黃信介), Hsu Hsin-liang, Yao Chia-wen (姚嘉文), and Shih Ming-teh (施明德) held a demonstration to protest Yu’s arrest. Gathering against the will of Yu’s family on January 22 near Kaohsiung Bridge, demonstrators distributed pamphlets entitled Tell me: Why did you arrest Yu Deng-fa and his son? This protest, which violated the government’s Emergency Decree of prohibiting demonstrations, marked a major step forward in Taiwan’s democracy movement. In response, the KMT did not intend to loosen its grip on these dissidents. Confrontation between the two sides was aggravated when the Control Yuan passed a resolution on April 20, 1979, calling for the impeachment of Taoyuan County Magistrate Hsu Hsin-liang for his participation in the Kaohsiung Bridge rally and, on June 29, Hsu was suspended from his post.
The dangwai became more organized in defiance of the KMT, however, and on June 2, 1979, more than 20 non-KMT members, including Yao Chia-wen, Huang Huang-hsiung (黃煌雄), and Lu Hsiu-lien (呂秀蓮), gathered in Taipei to establish the Association for the Dangwai Candidates Participating in Supplementary Elections for Parliamentarians (增額中央民意代表選舉黨外候選人聯誼會) in an effort to consolidate anti-KMT power. On July 28, Jhang Chun-nan (張春男), Lu Hsiu-lien, and other dangwai candidates traveled to Taichung to deliver speeches and hold demonstrations. Police subsequently used water cannons to disperse these demonstrations, and dangwai members were even labeled “communists” by some people. Despite these setbacks, members of the dangwai continued their efforts, eventually becoming the forerunners of Taiwan’s new party, the Democratic Progressive Party.
What the KMT feared most was organized opposition forces of the Taiwanese. Therefore, the KMT Right-wingers became extremely nervous and took a variety of countermeasures, but only made things worse. The final direct confrontation between Taiwanese society and the state was the launching of the Formosa magazine, which developed into a political organization and culminated in the so-called Kaohsiung Incident, or the Formosa Incident.
In March 1979, the Nationalist government relaxed restrictions on free speech to cope with changes taking place both at home and abroad. Thus, despite the ban on political magazines, their publication never completely stopped. For instance, when The Taiwan Political Review was banned, The Eighties took its place and became successful. As for why the dangwai felt it necessary to publish The Formosa Magazine, there are two possible reasons. Firstly, the quality and quantity of Taiwan’s middle-class intellectual elite was rapidly increasing. The greater diversity within this group made it impossible for their demands to be met through only a single publication. Secondly, the new generation hoped to speed up political reform, with some people dissatisfied with Kang Ning-hsiang’s (康寧祥) moderate, reconciliatory attitude.
The process of establishing Formosa magazine ran as follows. On December 25, following cancellation of the election (due to the US severance of ties with Taiwan), the dangwai held a press conference on Taipei’s Minzu West Road. At this press conference, Huang Hsin-chieh publicly recommended the formation of a group consisting of Hsu Hsin-liang, Chang Chun-hung, Yao Chia-wen, Lin I-hsiung (林義雄), and Shih Ming-teh for promoting democratic activities, with the first four of these persons responsible for mapping out strategies, and Shih Ming-teh in charge of implementation. In March 1979, Huang, Chang, and Yao held a meeting at Shih’s home in which Huang proposed that Yao apply for a publishing license to set up a magazine that could serve as the dangwai gazette. On August 16, 1979, the debut issue of Formosa was released under the headline, “Joint Promotion of the New Generation’s Political Movements,” and this subsequently became the magazine’s goal. Staff members of the magazine included all kinds of anti-KMT figures, including both unification and independence advocates, but shared a common ground: the pursuit of freedom and democracy on the island. The sale of Formosa increased quickly, taking Taiwan by storm. The 25,000 copies of the initial issue sold out immediately after hitting the newsstands, and more had to be printed. The second and third issues grew to a circulation of nearly 100,000 copies, and the fourth issue surpassed 110,000. Formosa was breaking all previous records set by a political review magazine published in Taiwan.
More importantly, all of Taiwan’s anti-KMT elements began to rally under the banner of Formosa magazine, which served as a force to counterbalance the Nationalist government. To increase sales and expand its network even further, Formosa magazine began consolidating local anti-KMT powers around the island into a political group by aiming to establish 20 service centers in major counties and cities. Formosa magazine established the Kaohsiung service center on September 28, 1979, Taichung center on October 25, and Nantou center on November 12. By December 1979, 15 service centers had been established, all within a few months. The rapid development of these centers was akin to the establishment of a political party, which was Formosa magazine’s real goal. Shih Ming-teh once said that Formosa magazine was “a political party without name” (沒有黨名的黨) that was prepared to use “legal methods to overthrow the government” (合法推翻政府). Apparently, Formosa magazine was the embryonic form of a political group whose goal was to organize a political party.
The Nationalist government knew that in order for a minority to control the majority, it was necessary to adopt a policy of “prevention in place of suppression” (防範重於鎮壓), and consider as taboo the establishment of [political] organizations. Security agencies became extremely nervous and, on October 17, 1979, a meeting of 22 KMT security agencies adopted a proposal to ban Formosa magazine under the pretext that the magazine’s second issue, with a story entitled “Unveil the Myth of the Korean Economic Miracle” (揭發韓國經濟奇蹟的神話), had resulted in a protest from the Korean Embassy. Formosa magazine did not comply with the ban, and, in the end, it was not enforced. In fact, the Nationalist government tried to tone down the situation and establish a dialogue with the opposition, inviting dangwai members to KMT-sponsored luncheons in October and November to discuss the matter. Their opposing standpoints made it hard to reach any consensus, however. Moreover, the timing was ripe and the opposition was prepared to begin its journey forward. In contrast, the KMT authorities knew that if they did not put a stop to these trends, they would gradually be forced to give ground and relinquish their grip on power. Thus, while the opposition continued to fan the flames ever higher, the authorities were making an all-out effort to extinguish those same fires, even going so far as to hire radical right-wingers and local gangsters for this purpose. Consequently, the curtains on an increasingly volatile drama continued to rise.
On September 8, 1979, members of Formosa magazine held a reception at the Taipei Mandarin Hotel to celebrate the premier issue of Formosa, and invited party and government officials to attend. Members of the magazine Gust including the “defectors for freedom” (反共義士) Lao Jheng-wu (勞政武) and Shen Guang-siou (沈光秀) also gathered people at the same location, however, in order to “condemn the national traitor Chen Wan-jhen (陳婉真),” throwing stones and fruit skins and cursing loudly in an attempt to instigate a confrontation. These members were actually undercover agents, sent to China earlier by Ye Siang-jhih (葉翔之) while he was serving as chief of the ROC Military Intelligence Bureau, who later withdrew to Hong Kong in order to establish themselves as “defectors for freedom.”
On November 29, 1979, assailants wielding swords and axes ransacked the residence of Formosa magazine’s publisher, Legislator Huang Hsin-chieh, and the magazine’s Kaohsiung service center. At 1:40 p.m. on December 7, six unidentified assailants also attacked the Pingtung service center, which was originally scheduled to hold an inaugural party entitled “The Night of Formosa” (美麗島之夜) at 6:30 p.m. the following evening. Demolishing phones, tables, and chairs, the attackers, two of whom were armed with guns, held the center’s staff hostage and injured one person with an axe. The fact that these raids in Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Pingtung occurred at almost exactly the same time proved that they were not isolated incidents. Despite these attacks, however, there was no way to curb public sentiment. Thus, when the inaugural party in Pingtung was held as planned at 6:30 p.m. on December 8 but at a new location, the auditorium of Ren-ai Elementary School (仁愛國小), many people attended even though they had not received invitations, packing the floor. It was later alleged that members of the magazine Gust carried out the attacks on Huang Hsin-chieh’s residence and the Kaohsiung and Pingtung service centers. The rapid intensification in organized and violent confrontation between society and the state finally led to the Kaohsiung Incident.
To celebrate International Human Rights Day, Formosa magazine’s Kaohsiung service center applied for a permit to hold a human rights seminar on December 10 at an indoor stadium. Their application was rejected, however, so the magazine submitted a new application to hold the event in Fu Lun Park (扶輪公園) opposite the President Department Store (大統百貨公司) which, again, was rejected. In the meantime, agencies in charge of social order began to send additional agents to monitor the magazine’s personnel. Formosa magazine’s Kaohsiung office therefore decided to proceed with its original plan in the belief that a December 10 Human Rights Day demonstration would help to highlight the improper restrictions on freedom under Taiwan’s martial law.
On the afternoon of the 9th, the Kaohsiung service center sent two vehicles to roam major thoroughfares and smaller alleyways making announcements about the event. Both ran into conflicts with the police, however, and were stopped in Kaohsiung’s Gushan District (鼓山區) by law-enforcement agents, who promptly seized the vehicles’ audiotapes and arrested Yao Guo-jian (姚國建) and Ciou Sheng-syong (邱勝雄). While being taken into custody at the Southern Garrison Command, Yao hit his head against the stairs and broke two of his teeth. That evening, over 40 dangwai activists held a silent protest at the building’s entrance and, after midnight, even more supporters joined in. Yao and Ciou were eventually released.
This series of incidents shows that Formosa magazine was becoming increasingly involved with political activities and building up social momentum on a scale that had not been seen since the February 28 Incident of 1947. A number of leaders were even preparing to fight for their cause with the do-or-die spirit of a martyr. For the government, these incidents led to the largest crisis to face the KMT since the February 28 Incident, where the slightest slipup might spell doom for the government. The government, ruling party, and just about everyone with mainland origins, felt deeply threatened by the situation and demanded that drastic measures be taken. By this time, both the state and society had drawn their weapons, the fuse for confrontation was already primed, and it only required the smallest of sparks to set it off. Not surprisingly, it was the Human Rights Day activities of December 10, which would become known as the Kaohsiung or Formosa Incident, that set things in motion. Details of this event are as follows.
On the afternoon of December 10, the Kaohsiung service center continued to make announcements that speeches would be delivered on time as scheduled. By 4 p.m., anti-riot vehicles had blocked off the venue at the roundabout and, by 7 p.m., close to 200 people had gathered at the intersection beside Formosa magazine’s Kaohsiung headquarters. Shih Ming-teh was in command, and everyone was given a lit torch. The group began to march and, since there were anti-riot vehicles on the right, took a left turn and continued toward the train station, stopping at a small roundabout for speeches before a crowd of two to three hundred people. A few minutes later, several anti-riot vehicles arrived and began circling the venue. By this time, policemen had encircled the intersection and were clasping hands to prevent traffic from entering and protestors from leaving. As tension and unrest began to mount, scuffles erupted between the crowds and the police.
There were many different versions of how these conflicts began. The official government version was that the crowds attacked the police first; whereas dangwai activists maintained it was the police who instigated the rioting by driving riot-control vehicles into the crowds. There was also speculation that the attackers were government infiltrators planted by intelligence agencies to initiate violent confrontations in order to frame Formosa magazine. Some have conjectured the incident was a plot by the 1205 [December 5] Special Task Team (一二○五專案小組) under Wang Sheng, while the Gust Group (疾風集團) claimed it was the result of an attempt to flush instigators out into the open. Others believed that the government had hired thugs to stir up conflicts, while others felt that the people who had fought with law-enforcement officers were actually soldiers (as they had crew cut hair) disguised as civilians. With so many contradictory versions, the truth remains a mystery to this day.
What a Spartan regime fears most is that its subjects will become organized. It was to be expected, therefore, that the Nationalist government would not just sit back without taking action. During the KMT’s fourth plenary session on December 11, some people insisted that “stronger, more hard-line countermeasures” be taken. On December 12, demands for disciplinary action grew, and the authorities decided to take punitive measures. On December 13, the Government Information Office (行政院新聞局) suspended Formosa magazine’s publication license for one year and, at the same time, the TGGH announced that the illegal assembly of people in Kaohsiung was obviously an organized, planned, and premeditated action. Fourteen persons were arrested for suspicion of sedition: Chang Chun-hung, Yao Chia-wen, Wang Tuoh (王拓), Chen Chu (陳菊), Jhou Ping-de (周平德), Su Ciou-jhen (蘇秋鎮), Lu Hsiu-lien, Ji Wan-sheng (紀萬生), Lin I-hsiung, Chen Jhong-sin (陳忠信), Yang Cing-chu (楊清矗), Ciou Yi-bin (邱奕彬), Wei Ting-chao, and Jhang Fu-jhong (張富忠). The TGGH also issued an arrest warrant for Shih Ming-teh, offering NT$500,000 for information leading to his capture. On January 8, 1980, after 25 days in hiding, Shih was finally arrested in Taipei, meaning that everyone connected to the Kaohsiung Incident was then in police custody.
Although hearings for earlier sedition cases had been held behind closed doors, because of the attention it had attracted from international media and human rights groups, the TGGH made the Kaohsiung Incident trial open to the public. The court of inquiry began its hearings on March 18, 1980, and completed all of its interrogations and cross-examinations by March 28. A military prosecutor then indicted the defendants for attempting to commit sedition through establishment of a “five-person group”; using Formosa magazine as a center to promote its plans to usurp power; establishing as many as 11 offices in a matter of months to promote mass movements; and initiating moves to overthrow the government. For these reasons, the prosecutor sought punishment for all of the defendants. On April 18, following a month-long hearing, a TGGH court martial announced its verdicts: a 14-year prison term and 10-year deprivation of civil rights for Huang Hsin-chieh; life-long imprisonment and deprivation of civil rights for Shih Ming-teh; and 12-year prison terms and 10-year deprivation of civil rights each for Yao Chia-wen, Chang Chun-hung, Lin I-hsiung, Lin Hong-syuan (林弘宣), Lu Hsiu-lien, and Chen Chu.
Strangely, according to Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Statute for the Punishment of Sedition (懲治叛亂條例), the only sentence available for those found guilty of committing such acts was the death penalty. Why were those convicted in the Kaohsiung Incident not sentenced to death in accordance with the law? As the court verdict explained, “the defendants committed serious offenses, either at the instigation of overseas traitors or without a clear understanding of the situation. When indicted, however, all felt deep remorse for the violence that ensued from the Kaohsiung Incident. Therefore … their sentences were reduced at the court’s discretion as a show of sympathy.” In reality, the sentences were lighter because of changes in the internal and external environment, which prevented the Nationalist government from reproducing the “February 28 effect” (二二八效應) via suppression. Although the judgments were strict, a degree of leniency was shown in order to leave room for compromise. Conversely, anti-KMT social forces became more united after the incident, forcing the government to repeatedly seek reconciliation through increasingly moderate means and accelerating Taiwan’s moves toward localization and democratization. Taiwan’s transition away from authoritarian rule was achieved by a more progressive and peaceful approach than that of either the Philippines or South Korea, whose transitions were characterized by violence, bloodshed, and even assassinations (such as the murder of South Korean political leader Park Chung Hee).
The Lifting of Martial Law and Democratization
In terms of the strategies pursued in the wake of the Kaohsiung Incident, the Nationalist government became more defensive and gradually retreated. In terms of tactics, however, it sometimes continued to act aggressively in order to prevent opposition forces from growing too quickly and maintain political stability. The primary action taken by the government was to ban dissident publications. For instance, on August 15, 1980, the Taipei City Information Department imposed a one-year suspension on the publication of two magazines, Warm Current (暖流) and Gust (疾風). On September 24, 1980, the TGGH banned books written by Lin I-hsiung, Yao Chia-wen, and Chang Chun-hung, including A Tiger Out of Its Element (虎落平陽), Campaigning and Changing the Law (護法與變法), From Lanyang to Wufong (從蘭陽到霧峰), My Thoughts and Struggles (我的沉思與奮鬥), and A Collection of Jing Han’s Selected Works (景涵選集). Moreover, government intelligence agencies also took harsh and inappropriate measures against dissidents to serve as warnings for others, such as the infamous murder cases of Chen Wen-cheng (陳文成) at the National Taiwan University in July 1981 and Henry Liu (劉宜良), better known by his pen name of Jiang Nan (江南), at his San Francisco home on October 15, 1984. The fact that Chen and Liou were both US citizens and that their murders were associated with government intelligence agencies caused widespread indignation in the US ruling and opposition parties, greatly tarnishing the Nationalist government’s image. Consequently, this not only contributed nothing to the perpetuation of KMT’s authoritarian system, but on the contrary, hastened its decline.
Although the individuals associated with Formosa magazine were all sentenced to prison terms, they won sympathy from a majority of the people. Their thinking and views did not disappear but, rather, grew stronger. Soon, waves of protests began to emerge. On August 29, 1980, Hsu Hsin-liang began publishing Formosa Weekly (美麗島週刊) in the US; on July 23, 1981, The Asians (亞洲人) was suspended and banned after the publication of the second issue of its first volume (March 1980), but resumed operations later that same month; on October 30, 1983, the Association of Supporters for Taiwan’s Political Prisoners and Their Families (臺灣良心犯受刑人暨家屬後援會) was established; and on April 26, 1984, Huang Hsin-chieh began a hunger strike in prison, and was later joined by Lin Hong-syuan, Chang Chun-hung, and Yao Chia-wen. Their families, and dangwai members who had been elected to public office formed the Association of Supporters for the Hunger Strike Being Held by Political Prisoners of the Kaohsiung Incident (美麗島政治犯絕食聲援會) and launched a three-day hunger strike movement on May 4. On December 9, 1984, the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (臺灣人權促進會) was formally established, with Chiang Peng-chien (江鵬堅) serving as chairman; on April 12, 1985, the dangwai political journals New Tide Review (新潮流評論) and Taiwan Era (臺灣年代) began publication; on July 18, 1985, the responsible persons and editors of a dozen different dangwai political magazines filed a petition with the Executive Yuan concerning the confiscation of related magazines; on March 28, 1986, Shih Ming-teh began a hunger strike to demand release of all political prisoners being held by the Nationalist government; and on May 19, 1986, the dangwai held a special event at the Longshan Temple in Taipei’s Wanhua District entitled 519 Green Action (五一九綠色行動), which not only demanded the lifting of martial law but also laid the groundwork for holding a demonstration that would end with the delivery of a petition to the Office of the President. All of these actions reveal how protest activities were gradually developing into an unstoppable force.
The crowning achievement of the dangwai’s efforts was the successful founding of an opposition party, thereby putting an end to the KMT’s one-party authoritarian rule. Their pioneering work dates back to September 28, 1982, when dangwai members held their first meeting in Taipei’s Zhongshan Hall (中山堂) to present six points, including the enactment of a national fundamental law (國家基本法), under the general principles of democracy, unity, and national salvation.
On January 8, 1984, a draft motion was passed to form the Dangwai Campaign Assistance Group (黨外後援會; DCAG); on February 25, the organizational ordinance of the Dangwai Association of Public Functionaries for Public Policy Research (黨外公職人員公共政策研究會) was adopted by independent public functionaries; on June 7, the Alliance of Dangwai Writers and Editors (黨外編輯作家聯誼會; ADWE) held a forum to discuss the organization of an opposition group; on August 28, a dangwai parliamentarian joint service center was instituted in Jhongli; and on September 2, the Dangwai Public Policy Research Association (黨外公共政策會; DPPRA) was created.
The DPPRA convened its first plenary session on August 23, 1985, and its first board of directors meeting on March 10, 1986. At the latter, the DPPRA admitted two chapters from Kaohsiung and decided to accept applications from other branches as well. On April 12, 1986, approval was given to Provincial Assemblyman Yu Shyi-kun’s (游鍚堃) application to set up an Yilan chapter, the formation of which was guided by You Ching (尤清). Six days later on April 18, the KMT decided that, as the DPPRA was to set up local branches, it should be dissolved within a set period of time. If this were not done, both the DPPRA headquarters and all of its chapters would face a crackdown. Despite this serious threat, the DPPRA pressed on, establishing chapters in Taipei, Taichung, and Pingtung on May 17, June 3, and June 22, respectively. On August 5, 1986, the Taipei chapter held an opening ceremony for its new clubhouse. On August 9, the DPPRA hosted a presentation assembly for the formation of a political party at Chin-hwa Junior High School (金華國中), and on August 15, with the ADWE, jointly hosted the presentation assembly for forming a new political party according to constitutional provisions at Chung-shan Elementary School (中山國小). On September 7, 1986, Time magazine carried a story about the research and plans for establishing a future party platform drafted by the ADWE Taskforce for the Formation of a Political Party (組黨工作小組).
On September 28, 1986, dangwai leaders announced the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨), released a draft of its party platform, and appointed seven members to continue work on the party’s organization. The KMT government made no effort to suppress these moves but, instead, made a simple announcement on September 30, 1986 through a three-member task force which was responsible for contact and communication with the party, demanding further communication with the DPP or be subject to legal prosecution. It was in this manner that the KMT’s authoritarian rule was finally broken, and Taiwan’s first native political party since the end of World War II was precariously born.
Since the KMT was unable to root out dangwai power with a single blow and to avoid head-on conflict, it embarked on a “step-by-step democracy” (分期付款式民主). In the supplementary election for central parliamentarians held on December 6, 1980, independent candidates did surprisingly well. Relatives of several jailed leaders of the Kaohsiung Incident, such as Chou Ching-yu (周清玉), Hsu Jung-shu (許榮淑), and Huang Tien-fu (黃天福), were also elected. In the elections for county magistrates, city mayors, and provincial and special municipal council members held on November 14, 1981, defense attorneys in the Kaohsiung Incident trials, including Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), were elected by huge margins. In the supplementary election of the Legislative Yuan held on December 3, 1983, however, the success rate for independent candidates decreased slightly from the previous election, with the KMT winning 62 seats and independent candidates only taking 9, primarily because of the KMT’s across-the-board counterattack. Nevertheless, the fact that Fang Su-min (方素敏), wife of imprisoned dissident Lin I-hsiung, was elected as a legislator, was widely interpreted as a signal of support for victims of the Kaohsiung Incident. Clearly, with the Kaohsiung Incident, the KMT failed to achieve the same level of intimidation as it had with the 228 Incident, and the foundation of its authoritarian rule was facing wide-ranging collapse.
With successful formation of the DPP on September 28, 1986, the supplementary election of central public representatives held that year marked the true beginnings of party politics and a competing two-party democracy in Taiwan.
In addition, the Nationalist government was accelerating the process of localization, with the number of Taiwanese taking important government posts slowly increasing to better reflect the general demographic structure of the island. One of the most concrete examples of the government’s resolve to promote localization was the selection of Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) to run on the ballot for ROC vice president. Under the guidance of Chiang Ching-kuo, who was then serving concurrently as ROC president and KMT chairman, the second plenum of the KMT’s 12th National Congress, held on February 15, 1984, chose Lee to serve as Chiang’s running mate in the upcoming presidential election. On May 20 of that same year, Chiang and Lee were sworn in as the ROC seventh-term president and vice president. In an interview with Time magazine held on August 16, 1985, Chiang further stated that he had ruled out any sort of dynastic solution of passing on power to a family member, and that the next president would be determined in accordance with the ROC Constitution. On January 25, 1986, during a celebration marking the anniversary of the implementation of the Constitution, Chiang clarified his stance even further by stating unambiguously that members of the Chiang family “could not and would not” run for the office of president, nor would military rule take place either. To prove his sincerity, on February 18, 1986, Chiang dispatched his son Chiang Hsiao-wu (蔣孝武), overseas to serve as a deputy representative of Taiwan’s trade delegation to Singapore.
In June 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo told several Taiwanese nestors: “Taiwan will soon be yours.” On July 15, 1987, after 38 years, the government officially ended martial law in Taiwan. Twelve days later, Chiang elaborated further by saying: “Although I am a Chinese, after eating Taiwanese rice for 40 years, I am also a Taiwanese.”
On January 13, 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo passed away. In accordance with the Constitution, Vice President Lee Teng-hui succeeded him to become the first native Taiwanese president. On March 21, 1990, the National Assembly elected Lee as the eighth-term president, ushering in the Lee Teng-hui era in Taiwan. Under Lee’s administration, many political reforms were carried out, such as further implementation of popular elections at central and local levels, lifting of martial law and the ban on new media and political parties, and amendments to the Constitution. Among these changes, lifting the martial law and the ban on new political parties, holding a comprehensive election of parliamentarians, and direct election of the president were accounted the most significance.
The democratization process peaked in March 1996, when Lee Teng-hui won the first direct presidential election in Taiwan’s history, and again in March 2000, when DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won the second direct presidential election. This marked the unprecedented change of governing party that ended the KMT’s five-decade hold on the office and thus made Taiwan a member of the world’s democracies. The peaceful democratization of Taiwan, which has been widely acclaimed as a “quiet revolution” (寧靜革命), was achieved via constant compromise and reconciliation between the state machine and societal forces, thereby making the ROC the first Chinese democracy.
