The Potential Significance of A Civil Power: Europe and Cross-Strait Relations

Michael Yahuda
Convenor, International Relations Department
The London School of Economics and Political Science
(Reprinted from the Taipei Journal, December 7, 14, and 28, 2001)

With its proposed development of an independent rapid reaction force, it is clear that the European Union aspires to be more than a civil power. But for much of its operations and particularly beyond its immediate geographical confines the EU acts largely as a civil power both in the aims it pursues and in the ways it pursues them. This is perhaps especially true of its activities in East Asia. It should be noted that this is not true of all of its member states, notably France and the UK, each of whom still has residual military responsibilities in the broader region and each of them deploys a limited naval force from time to time. Others, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have sold arms to different states. But the EU has so far confined itself to using, economic instruments, cultural and political exchanges to promote not only trade, investment and so on, but also peaceful approaches to the solution of problems, legality, good governance, poverty alleviation and so on. At issue here is the extent to which this approach can contribute to a peaceable settlement of cross-Strait relations.

In principle the European Union and the separate European states could play a significant role in cross Strait relations by lending their weight in opposition to attempts by the Chinese mainland to impose unification by the use of military force. Although the United States, and to a much lesser extent, Japan are the key external players, Europe could nevertheless exercise considerable influence in constraining China's leaders from deciding to use force even as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. The European Union is China's third most important trading partner, it is a major source for advanced technology and it is regarded by China's leaders as an one of the important counter weights to balance what they perceive as the undue dominance of the United States in world affairs. For its part, the EU is interested in deepening economic relations with China not only because of its vast potential domestic market and because of China's growing importance in the world. It also aims to use its deepening contacts to help bring about domestic changes in China that will bring about an effective legal system and significantly improve its observance of human rights so as to bring the country more into line with international norms. The EU sees such a development as promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

The use of force by Beijing against Taiwan would obviously run counter to the interests of the EU. Indeed on March 8 1996, that is on the day that the PRC first began firing missiles into 'test zones' in the Taiwan Strait, the EU Presidency issued a declaration regretting the exercise and calling upon the PRC "to refrain from activities which could have negative effects on the security of the entire region." It will be noted that the declaration was issued independently of the American despatch of the two carrier- led battle groups. However, there is little doubt that it was the seriousness of the American intent as signalled by the sending of the naval battle groups that carried weight in Beijing and continues to do so to this day.

The question which will be explored in this paper is what significance can be attached to the European position as an additional constraint upon the Chinese readiness to use force in the Taiwan Strait. Both Realist and Neo-Institut ional theories in International Relations allow for the possibility that the Europeans could play a significant role. I shall evaluate these in turn, before turning to consider the extent to which the Europeans are indeed committed to playing such a role and I shall conclude by examining the extent to which Taiwan can help to strengthen the European resolve.

The Realist Perspective

With its focus on power as the currency of international relations, Realism might be thought to offer little scope for a European role that depends upon economic pressure and the imponderables of the effects upon China of a damaged reputation. It is only once the European role is placed within a larger contextual framework that Realism can be seen have explanatory value in this case too. Any decision by the government in Beijing to use force to bring about unification with Taiwan, would have to take into account not only the capacity of the islanders to resist, but also the likelihood of an American military response. An American administration would be more likely to respond with military force of its own if it knew that its European allies also opposed the Chinese resort to force.

Moreover it is a basic tenet of classical Realism that one of the primary aims of governments is to stay in power. That is perhaps especially true of China's Communist Party leaders who habitually equate their interests and values with those of the Chinese state. Since they have claimed that their capacity to rule depends ultimately upon delivering stability and continued economic growth and development for the Chinese people, they can be expected to take very seriously potential risks that could undermine the economic prospects of the country. Given the crucial role that the foreign related aspects of the economy play in the country's overall economic growth and development, China's leaders would be unlikely to jeopardize that by precipitant military action. Indeed access to the European market and to European technology is considered particularly important by China's leaders as it frees them from exclusive dependence upon the United States and Japan, who for good Realist reasons, are more troublesome from the Chinese perspective. One argument that is frequently made is that the Chinese government might resort to the use of force against Taiwan as a means of uniting the people under the banner of patriotism if it were to feel in danger of domestic discord as a consequence of socio-economic difficulties. But if the use of force were to result in a massive downturn in the external related dimensions of the economy those socio-economic difficulties would immediately deepen with potentially even worse consequences for China's rulers.

Finally, from a Realist perspective, it is clear that China's interests would be better served by seeking common cause with other major power centers in the world so as to constrain the overweening power of the United States. The use of force in the Taiwan Strait against the objections of the Europeans would push them into siding with the United States against China. Moreover the Europeans might well seek to cushion their Southeast Asian associates from the worst economic effects of any regional instability caused by China's military actions. That would have the effect of weakening China's significance throughout the region. In short a Realist calculus shows that determined European opposition to the use of force by China in the Taiwan Strait could have a constraining effect upon China's leaders. To be effective such a constraint would depend upon the perception by China's leaders that the Europeans were indeed determined opponents of their use of force. As Realists they might calculate that the Europeans might seize the opportunity to make economic gains in China at the expense of the Americans. I shall return to the issue of the strength of the European determination after considering first the Neo-Institutionalist position.

The Neo-Institutionalist Approach

The Neo-Institutionalist approach claims that state behavior is modified over time through the experience of pursuing regular exchanges with others to meet long term common objectives. That will mean the subordination of short-term individual interests for the longer-term mutual advantage. That is best achieved through the adoption of common procedures, ideally subject to agreed rules and adjudication. Neo-institutionalism may be seen as having a two stage agenda: First it seeks to socialise or integrate states into an international community based on agreed universal norms and procedures associated with the UN Charter. Second, and building on the first, it seeks to get states to act with others in international society such as multi- national companies, NGOs, etc., to work towards reform of the world system. The goal is to meet global problems through better global governance in addressing environmental problems, issues arising out of economic globalization, migration, etc., and extending even to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.

Such an approach underlies much of the effort to anchor China within international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s and in the regional organizations such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum since the end of the Cold War. The idea is to encourage the Chinese government and perhaps its different ministries to participate in multilateral organizations so as to extend the practice of interdependence. That way it will not only encourage the Chinese authorities to recognize the advantages of multilateral cooperation, but it will also enmesh them in overlapping networks of association in which they will become habituated to solving problems with others without recourse to force. Indeed it would also cause them to recognize how much they would stand to lose by revoking these institutionalised practices.

In practice Neo Institutionalism may be said to be similar in its goals and means to that associated with the Western policy of seeking constructive engagement with China. The American version is often regarded as aggressively seeking to transform China into a free market democracy in the American image. But even the West European version, seeks something very similar in promoting greater respect for human rights, developing a proper legal system and a financial regulatory order commensurate with developing a proper market. The key difference made by the policy of engagement is the implication that sanctions may be used in the event of failure by China to comply.

In short the Neo-Institutionalist approach argues that by integrating China ever more closely into the international community, the Chinese authorities become habituated to interdependency which militates against the use of force and causes them to recognize that the threshold against the use of force has been raised significantly. In this regard it is precisely because European interests are less immediately engaged in the Taiwan issue than the other major developed countries, the US and Japan, it can be argued that they may exercise considerable influence upon China against the use of force. By pressing upon the Chinese how the use of force could damage their standing in the world and threaten to destabilize the region the Europeans could bring home to China's leaders the broader international adverse consequences that would follow.

In addition to calculations based on self- interest of either the Realist or Neo-institutionalist variety, Europeans will also be averse to the attempt by an authoritarian government to impose its will by force upon a democratic polity without the consent of its people. Indeed the European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Chris Patten, indicated as much in the course of a recent visit to Hong Kong, where he had previously been reviled by Beijing as the last British governor. In replying to a question about the relevance for Taiwan of the Hong Kong experience and of Beijing's model of the "one country two systems", Patten stated that he had never heard of a democratic country voluntarily choosing to be governed by an authoritarian one. Even if it were argued that European governments would be far more circumspect than the outspoken Chris Patten, there can be little doubt that European public opinion as expressed by various legislatures, the media and NGOs would echo his views.

Thus both Realist calculations, the logic of neo- institutional processes, and the liberal democratic principles espoused by most European institutions and peoples, suggest that it is very much in the European interest to dissuade China's leaders from using force to impose unification upon Taiwan.

The Problem of the Resolve of the Europeans

At issue would be the determination of the European governments and of the European Union to uphold their long-term interest in holding China to acceptable international behavior. In assessing the degree to which Europeans will uphold their collective interest in constraining the mainland Chinese from unifying Taiwan by force, attention must be paid to several dimensions that affect European policies towards cross Taiwan questions. At least three may be identified as particularly significant: First, the centrality of China in European approaches to the region as a whole and to the importance that is attached to the rise of China more generally. Second, the priority given to commercial interests that are immediate and on which the Europeans can be active and make a difference, as opposed to distant and longer-term strategic considerations on which they can make little immediate difference. This has been reinforced by the way the EU is organized which makes it much more effective in conducting trade and external economic relations than in pursuing political and strategic objectives. Finally, the policy of 'constructive engagement' in itself favors accommodation over confrontation and, in the absence of significant pressure from domestic constituencies or external allies, European governments will be wary of taking positions that will evoke official Chinese hostility.

The Centrality of China is evident the European attempts to develop coherent policies towards Asia in the aftermath of the Cold War. European thinking that was outlined in key documents of 1994 and 1995 all noted the new economic importance of East Asia and the need to adopt more active and coherent policies towards the region as a whole and china in particular. At that time the EU had clear institutional links with ASEAN as one of its long-standing dialogues partners, it was a founding member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and it had deep and multi- facetted ties with Japan. The one 'gap' was China and indeed a special EU Commission document was devoted entirely to policy towards that country. Although commercial considerations were emphasized by both the Commission and the separate governments (notably the 'big four' France, Germany, Italy and the UK), the new approach was still affected by the legacy of 'Tiananmen' of June 4th 1989 and the sanctions that the Europeans had imposed on China. Thus the commercial interest was balanced by an interest in promoting human rights and in deepening China's integration into the international community as a power that respected international norms.

Mindful of China's growing strategic significance in the Asia-Pacific and as a global player, the Europeans sought to develop a distinctive international 'voice' (i.e., as separate from the Americans) in seeking to influence Chinese behavior regarding Asian 'hot spots', arms control and various environmental matters. To these ends, the Europeans developed programmes at various levels including the Commission, national and local governments, to enhance the education of managers, bankers, financial regulators and so on; to promote law and lawyers through the supply of appropriate advisors and the training of lawyers and law enforcement officials; and to encourage net-working among potential epistemic communities. Provision was also made for support for European NGOs to operate in China and to participate more broadly in exchanges with China. Meanwhile formal ties with Beijing were continually being increased at the levels of both Union and that of individual states. The most notable of these arose out of meetings held in the shadow of ASEM when in 1998 it was agreed that the EU and China would hold heads of government meetings on an annual basis. Further in response to Chinese initiatives in 1997/98 key European states and the EU itself established formal 'constructive partnerships' with the Chinese government. The idea was to recognize each other as important centers that to varying degrees were independent of the United States. At the time of the Asian economic crisis in 1997/98 the Europeans happily went along with the Chinese claims that they had played a praiseworthy role in helping to stabilize the situation by refraining from devaluing the Chinese Yuan.

In view of China's permanent seat on the UN Security Council and its capacity to obstruct humanitarian intervention elsewhere in the world, Europeans governments cultivated the practice of being very circumspect about what they said in public about Chinese claims to Taiwan. That circumspection was re-enforced by the fact that they all recognized the PRC as representing China and accepted tacitly or explicitly, in one form or another, its claim that there was but one China of which Taiwan was a part. Consequently there was no forum, multi- lateral or bilateral in which they could raise the question of cross-Strait relations. As a result the Europeans had no institutional mechanism in which the Taiwan issue could be discussed with the Chinese on a regular basis. Yet there many venues in which they could address issues of significance to both sides.

Commercial Priorities have been at the center of European dealings with China. This should not be surprising as far as the EU is concerned. From the outset the EU (and its various earlier guises, such as the EEC) has been a customs union in which member states have delegated the regulation of trade to the European Commission. The Commission both sets policy and negotiates with others on behalf of its members as a whole. This is not true of foreign and security policies, where although there are matters in which policy positions may be held in common, European states on the whole conduct policy independently of the Commission. Thus in its attempts to articulate a common policy towards China, the Commission naturally stresses the commercial dimension and those aspects, such as the law and other regulatory procedures that can be seen to affect commerce. The Commission also expressed interest in broader issues such as arms control, environmental and social issues, international crime and even more overt security issues. But it has always been clear that the main areas in which the EU could make a difference was in the less overt security matters.

To a large extent this has also been true of European governments. Although they have been less limited in their external agenda because of organizational constraints, their capacity to affect the strategic situation by their own efforts is necessary limited. They simply lack the resources and the strategic imperative to overcome the vast geographical distance. Not even the British and the French, who alone have occasionally sent naval ships into East Asian waters, have claimed an interest in becoming involved or that they could make more than a symbolic difference were they to do so. By contrast the European governments have expended considerable effort in terms of using taxpayers' money and in exchanging leaders so as to promote commercial relations with China.

If the Commission negotiates the terms on which trade is conducted it is the member states, or rather the companies based in their territories, that actually conduct the commerce. It is important therefore to recognize the diversity of interests and policies that exist between the key European states. The European states compete with each other for market access and in the provision of state assistance (as in the form of export credit guarantees etc.,) in support of 'their' companies' contracts, joint ventures and so on. Each of the major countries, Germany, France, Britain and Italy has sought to stake out independent positions on certain issues and each has its own particular history and domestic concerns that shape its approach. Germany, for example, has tended to advance its own policies towards China under the cloak of the European Union rather than risk being seen to be especially assertive in pursuit of its own interests.

Yet from time to time Germany has had to temper its highly developed support for commercial activities in order to satisfy domestic constituencies concerned about human rights. This became particularly evident when the current coalition government involving the Greens and the Social Democrats was the only European government that joined the United States in voting within the World Bank against the proposed aid grant to allow Han Chinese to migrate to lands inhabited by Tibetan nomads. Under the previous government, presumably to avoid offending Beijing and risk potential commercial gains, Germany turned down the proposed agreement sponsored by one of its landers to sell submarine engines to Taiwan. The Netherlands and France have openly sold arms to Taiwan in the past. After being singled out by Beijing, France recanted in 1994 with a statement recognizing Beijing's sovereignty over Taiwan and pledged to stop the sale of any further arms. But it did not cancel the 1990 contracts to deliver 16 Lafayette frigates (worth $4.8 billion) and of 1992 to sell 60 Mirage-2000 fighter- interceptor aircraft (worth $3.8 billion) to Taipei with delivery that duly began in 1996. Moreover Paris has interpreted its commitment as ending the sale of offensive arms, whereas Beijing understands the commitment to end all arms sales. Thus the interests of commerce cut both ways. That is to say European governments have to pay heed to the interests of their arms related producers who need to export to survive. Given the continued prohibition of the sale of advanced weaponry to the PRC, there is a continuing temptation to sell to Taiwan. However, the intensity of the objections raised by Beijing to any such sales leads other domestic exporters to oppose them as well. Not surprisingly, any such deals tend to be enveloped in great secrecy. But now there is a new tendency by Europeans to join their American equivalents in competing to sell to Beijing advanced technology that could have dual use. Indeed as the legacy of Tiananmen has begun to fade, there are rumors that weapons manufacturers such as British Aerospace may be contemplating selling airborne over the horizon early warning systems to Beijing. Clearly commercial priorities that are not tempered by security concerns could undermine the broader purposes that the EU and its member governments profess to advance.

Constructive Engagement is meant to contribute to the reform process in China by encouraging greater transparency, better financial and accounting regulatory procedures, more effective legality, cleaner administration, better observance of human rights, etc. It is meant to do so through encouraging best practice while deepening and broadening exchanges with the Chinese at all levels including the commercial, the social, the cultural and even the military both within the realms of officialdom and beyond that to the population at large. This approach is contrasted with the alternative of isolation and estrangement which it is said would have adverse consequences for the Asia-Pacific and the wider world as well for the Chinese people themselves. An introspective China that dwelt on its alleged grievances as it failed to meet its people's expectations would be a danger to its neighbors and a source of instability to the world as a whole.

Whether isolation is indeed the only alternative to engagement is an open question, but the implications of the pursuit of engagement have not necessarily led to the results ostensibly sought by the Europeans. It should be noted that the Europeans do not formally use that term, preferring instead the concept of "constructive partnership". But in practice there is little to choose between them as they both envision the transformation of China's domestic politics and its international conduct. At issue is not one of terminology, but of the practical consequences of the pursuit of this policy. Even if it may be granted that the pursuit of this policy may contribute to domestic changes in China along the desired lines, it can only do so over the long-term. In the shorter term as the Chinese Communist Party and Government feels insecure, in part as a result of the reforms encouraged by the West, the abuse of human rights at home may intensify and the surge in nationalistic sentiment may become more virulent so as to threaten regional security. Since Western governments must deal with the government in Beijing in order to gain access to China's domestic society, they are continually confronted with the problem of how to deal with an immediate deterioration of the behavior of the Chinese government. Should they simply overlook gross violation of human rights or the failure to adhere to arms control agreements lest counter measures should result in a curtailing of exchanges by the Chinese side? In other words, does the process of engagement lead to an accommodation with the Chinese side that ends up by tying Western governments to their Chinese counterpart to the extent that it devalues the degree of leverage that the Western governments hoped to be able to exercise?

An example of the kinds of confusion that this process entails may be seen from the way the Europeans and the Americans have been embarrassed by the proceedings of the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva. In 1997 a resolution condemning China sponsored by Denmark, did not elicit the customary support from the Europeans who openly disagreed among themselves. In 1998 and 1999 no vote was taken on the issue as the Chinese undertook to sign the two UN conventions on Human Rights. It duly did so, but has yet to ratify them. In March 2000 the Europeans refused to back a US supported resolution condemning China even though none of the Western governments disputed the evidence that China's human rights record had deteriorated through the year. This deterioration was condemned by the European Parliament, with no noticeable impact on the conduct of China policy by the Commission or by the Council. The British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee criticized the British government for not being sufficiently forthright in public in criticizing China's overwhelming human rights violations. It also called upon the UK government to set criteria against which the success of its policy of engaging China in a dialogue could be tested. Thus in a year in which all agreed that the Chinese record of human rights violations had greatly deteriorated the European governments failed to satisfy their legislatures that they had taken a sufficiently robust stand against this or that their policy of pursuing a constructive dialogue produced tangible results. Not surprisingly, the German Chancellor called for patience: Claiming that "a market economy will force a democratic framework," he went to assert that "it has to be a step-by-step approach. It's going to take time. We have to be patient…"

The Taiwanese Response

It was not until the 1980s that the government in Taiwan made deliberate efforts to cultivate relations with the Europeans who did not respond in kind until the 1990s. The relative lateness of these developments derives in part from the lack of close relations between the two sides for most of the 20th century and in part from changes in the international environment concerning China. From a Taiwanese perspective the key turning point was the American recognition of the PRC in place of the ROC as the representative of the Chinese state. Once the battle for formal recognition had been finally lost with the key Western power, Taiwan clearly needed to cultivate relations with other important Western states (despite their recognition of the PRC) so as to avoid becoming exclusively dependent upon the US and to create more international space for itself.

Emphasizing economic relations, Taiwan actively promoted exports to Western Europe and by the end of 1990 two-way trade with what was then the EC had reached, US$ 22 billion, equal to the PRC's trade with the region. The expansion of economic relations led to the increase of other links to facilitate travel, investment, banking, etc., that called for the arrangement of the equivalent of consular services. Despite opposition from Beijing a direct airline service was established between Taipei and Amsterdam. By the end of the 1990s the EU had become Taiwan's third most important trading partner with overall trade valued in 1998 at over $36 billion. Taiwan had 25 representative offices in Europe and 17 European countries operated 18 representative offices in Taiwan, while full diplomatic relations were maintained with the Vatican and Macedonia. Many of the European representative offices were upgraded in the 1990s with the counterparts in Europe being renamed with the title of "Taipei Representative Offices" and in several cases their diplomats were allowed diplomatic privileges. Political exchanges also increased substantially with some 50 ministers and 60 vice ministers from Western Europe visiting Taiwan since 1990, while the traffic the other way was even thicker with 50 such ministers from Taiwan visiting European countries in their official capacities since 1997.

Much of the growing interest by the Europeans in Taiwan that intensified in the 1990s may be seen as a response not only to the growing significance of their economic relations, but also as a consequence of changes in the international situation. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe culminating in the disintegration of the Soviet Union initially reduced the international strategic significance of China. The end of Cold War also gave greater salience to democratization as key factor in international relations. Both these changes worked to the advantage of Taiwan as it was clearly undergoing a process of democratization while considerable international obloquy still attached to the PRC as a consequence of Tiananmen.

However, the balance of advantage began to change back to the advantage of Beijing as its economy grew at a spectacular rate from 1992 onwards and as the Tainanmen massacre began to recede in time. Thus further enhancement of the European relationship with Taiwan slowed down after the EU attempted to re-invigorate relations with the PRC that followed the publications of its Asia and China policy documents in 1994 and 1995. As we have seen, the renewed focus on China by the Europeans entailed a greater susceptibility to the concerns of the PRC leaders. The clearest example, perhaps was the acceptance by the Europeans of the PRC position that human rights concerns are best addressed through "dialogue rather than confrontation". This led to refusals by some of the Europeans to vote for resolutions condemning China's record at the relevant UN Committee at Geneva even though they conceded that the Chinese record had not improved. The Europeans also became more susceptible to PRC objections to proposed arms sales to Taiwan.

Although the EU position was alleviated by its condemnation of the Chinese missile firings in 1996, the impression remains that the EU and the European governments are attentive to the concerns of Beijing with the result that they are rather restrained in their comments upon Taiwan. For example the Europeans have been less enthusiastic than might have been expected for the development of democracy. This is in striking contrast to European legislatures. The European Parliament has passed several resolutions that take note of the democratization of Taiwan and that are far more critical of the PRC than either the Commission or the Council of Ministers. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons took the Foreign Secretary to task for what it regarded as his insufficient enthusiasm for the development of democracy in Taiwan. It recommended that the UK "should take account of the remarkable development of Taiwanese democracy by incrementally strengthening relations - mainly by exchanges of visits." It did add, however, that the UK should not go so far as to recognize Taiwan as a state.

Taiwan generally benefits from favorable treatment by European academics and journalists. The image of it projected by the European press, radio, television and electronic media is of a democratic country valiantly resisting bullying by an over-bearing China. At least some of the credit for that stems from Taiwanese efforts over the last two decades to cultivate relations with the Europeans. If the first centered mainly on developing economic ties, the second decade of the 1990s built on these to deepen institutional, educational and social ties. The three concepts recently advanced by Foreign Minister, Dr. Hung- mao Tien, of "democracy-based diplomacy", "civilian based diplomacy" and "public opinion-based diplomacy" are all evident in the conduct of relations with Europe. The first has involved cooperation with human rights organizations and democratic institutions as part of the growing significance attached to these matters since the end of the Cold War. The second, sometimes described as 'second track' has led to participation in NGOs and exchanges with cities, political parties, academic institutions, think tanks and businesses. Finally, Europeans are increasingly appreciating that Taiwan's foreign policy is ultimately determined by public support.

The democracy issue, however, does lead to problems for European governments. Since they recognize the PRC as the legitimate state representing China and since they also recognize the "one China" principle they are unable to extend formal recognition to the ROC, nor can they envision extending recognition to an independent Taiwanese state. That means that they do not recognize the democratization of Taiwan as an exercise in self-determination. That also creates difficulties for them in supporting efforts by the ROC/Taiwan to gain recognition by the United Nations. It also means that they have difficulties in asserting that unification depends on the expressed opinion of the people of Taiwan. Hence the key for the m is in insisting that force should not be used as that would threaten peace and stability in the region and indeed in the world as a whole. So far European governments have tended to

Conclusion

The Europeans have a role to play in cross-Strait relations in encouraging both sides to reach a negotiated settlement, but it is essentially the role of a 'civilian power'. It is precisely the great geographical distance of Taiwan from Europe that offers the European the opportunity to play that role. They are more readily seen as having no particular geopolitical axe to grind and therefore their warnings about the terrible consequences that would result from the use of force should carry credibility. The geopolitical interests of Japan and the United States are closely involved in whatever outcome may ensue from cross-Strait relations so that their warnings would not necessarily be taken at face value.

But as we have seen, the European approach to balancing relations between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan are affected by changes in the international situation. That requires that both the Europeans and the Taiwanese should ensure that they continue to develop and expand the less formal aspects of international diplomacy and explore further the new agenda of the post Cold War era.