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C. The Undeclared "Special State-to-State" Formulation：A Year-End Review of President Chen's Mainland Policy
By Su Chi
Professor, the Institute of China Studies, Tamkang University
Convener, the National Security Division, National Policy Foundation
A paper delivered at a conference sponsored by the National Policy Foundation, May 13, 2001, Taipei
Introduction
Critiquing the mainland policy of the Chen Shui-bian administration after one year in office is no easy matter. During the first few months after his inauguration on May 20, 2000, the period of the so-called "government of all the people," the officials made various statements, but differed in what they had to say. The differences between agencies were enormous, and subordinates even denied statements made by their superiors. In the current period of the "minority government" led by Mr. Chang Chun-hsiung, the plethora of differing views has diminished; but clearly, virtually nothing substantive is being said. Now that an entire year has passed, the Chen Administration has yet to offer a complete explanation to the nation of the mainland policy it advocates or is currently pursuing. When the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was in opposition and during its campaign for the presidency, it was able to come up with a mainland policy white paper. But having been in power the past year, for some reason it now has no relatively complete and detailed written or oral explanation regarding this topic of widespread concern to the Taiwan public and the international community. No wonder the average member of the public often feels that our mainland policy is vague and unclear, and specialists in various fields can only piece together a general impression of the Chen Administration's mainland policy from the tangle of pertinent government statements and its chaotic administrative behavior.
Frankly speaking, what is missing from this all is a central axis. Without it, one cannot see clearly what the Republic of China's mainland policy currently is. And what is this axis? What does it derive from? What does it affect? Is it beneficial or detrimental for our nation's future? These are the central issues that this essay will explore.
Origins of the "special state-to-state" formulation .
To answer the question of what the "central axis" may be, we must hearken back to a year ago, to the interval between the transfer of power and the election. The designated chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council, Ms. Tsai Ying-wen, made it clear in early May that upon taking office on May 20, she would not again mention the "special state-to-state" formulation. However, not long thereafter during a private meeting, she personally stated to me that, "hereafter we will no longer speak of the 'special state-to-state' formulation but will continue to implement it." I was even more stunned by this statement at the time than I was two years ago on July 10, 1999, when flying back to Taiwan, I first heard on the entrance ramp at Chiang Kai-shek International Airport that then President Lee Teng-hui announced " a special state-to-state relationship" between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland. This was not just because it involved the credibility of an official or a government, but because of the potential impact that this new policy might have on the national interest and the welfare of the public. For me, caught up in the furor of the "special state-to-state" formulation in July 1999 and having worked so hard to alleviate the crisis, this phrase brought up many painful memories.
Most outsiders have only limited knowledge of the origins of the "special state-to-state" formulation. And I am afraid that even I only have partial knowledge. What is verifiable is that few people took part in its drafting process. Besides Tsai Ying-wen and Chang Jung-feng（now Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council）, who were leading members of the NSC, only a number of scholars assisted in studying the subject. Others, including high-level presidential office and ministerial officials,were not in on the confidential matter. At the end of June 1999,just before I left for the U.S., Ms. Tsai and Mr. Chang informed me about a small portion of it. At the time, I strenuously advocated caution, recommending that the government should first discuss it in full before it was released. And I left Taipei with their assurance that indeed a brainstorm session be organized in mid-July. Who would have thought that on Friday, July 9,while I was still traveling, former President Lee Teng-hui would suddenly announce it and create such a furor?
On the morning of Monday, July 12, a meeting was held to discuss it, and the original creators of the formulation refused to face the media and offer an explanation. At the time, I realized that the Republic of China had been plunged into its biggest crisis for many years. Although the missile "test-firing" crisis of 1995/96 was serious, the government only had to deal with a threat from Beijing; the public in Taiwan was behind us in dealing with a foe; and the international community strongly supported us. However, after the "special state-to-state" formulation was announced, the Republic of China had to face the ire of friend and foe alike. This is the first time in my memory that such a crisis has occurred. There was a considerable wave of adverse reaction in Taiwan as well. For one such as myself responsible for mainland policy, there were three options: 1) publicly express my doubts about the "special state-to-state" formulation, and even resign in protest; 2) refuse to go on record, leaving it to the Office of the President or the National Security Council to pick up the pieces; or 3) temporarily not discuss whether the "special state-to-state" formulation was right or wrong, but rather first do everything possible to deal with the immediate situation at hand. The first option would have assuaged my conscience and my senses. However it would not have helped the situation; it would only have made things worse. The second option-given that a number of key people refused to appear-would have left the government paralyzed, and would have harmed the national interest. So my ultimate decision was to temporarily set aside any concern for praise or criticism or my own convictions to deal with a national emergency, and appear on behalf of its "authors" to alleviate the crisis.
During the following three weeks, the cross-strait military situation was extremely tense, and support from within and without the government was very limited. As a member of the crisis task force at the time, I was the only window to the public. So I had to safeguard the government's dignity and defend the "special state-to-state" formulation. But I also had to safeguard the national interest and gradually make the "special state-to-state" formulation more palatable. This was a difficult challenge. Several major statements I made were based on the conclusions reached in the crisis task force discussions. However, given the enormous disparity between the "special state-to-state" formulation and the "one China" concept and "one China, with differing interpretations" formulation that the outside world was used to, giving it a palatable interpretation was a daunting task. There was no way for me to tell others of what I was going through, I could only keep silent in the face of each misunderstanding and recrimination.
Amidst all this, the most unforgettable incident took place on the afternoon of July 12 during a press conference attended by members of the Taiwan and international press. The disparity between the "special state-to-state" formulation and the "one China" concept existed not only in the minds of the reporters on hand, but also in my own mind. So every time I replied to a question about "one China," I carefully affixed "the Chinese Communists'," "Beijing's," or "their" as adjectives to avoid any direct challenges to the "one China" concept itself (see page 3 summary in the July 13 edition of the Chinese-language United Daily News). Unfortunately, given that the prominence of the "special state-to-state" formulation at the time, this subtle but crucial distinction was overlooked and most people felt that the government of the Republic of China had begun to oppose the "one China" concept itself rather than Beijing's "one China" principle. Ironically, that was the original intent of the framers of the "special state-to-state" formulation, and not my intent. What I gained most from this period of attempting to provide some spin was a deeper understanding of the ramifications and motives behind the "special state-to-state" formulation and its creators.
Through the joint efforts of certain people, the furor over the "special state-to-state" formulation began to abate after the Straits Exchange Commission and Mainland Affairs Council issued statements on July 31 and August 1, respectively, affirming "one China, with different interpretations" as the basis of ROC government cross-strait policy. The framers of the "special state-to-state" formulation were unwilling to see their hard work be spun into "one China, with different interpretations," and continued to criticize me through reports filed by designated journalists. This criticism continued until October 10, when President Lee himself reaffirmed the "one China, with different interpretations" formulation at a National Day celebration, after which they ceased.
Having successfully spun the "special state-to-state" formulation into "one China, with different interpretations," I decided to ignore the slings and arrows of those who had created the "special state-to-state" formulation. I also decided not to publicize Ms. Tsai's remark to me about "carrying out, but not speaking of the 'special state-to-state' formulation," figuring that the statement of one person did not represent the entire government, and that a momentary remark did not necessarily represent profound thinking on the subject. Around May 20 of last year when I was to leave office, many friends in the media asked me to account for the content and development of the "special state-to-state" formulation. In view of the tense cross-strait situation then and to avoid adding to cross-strait suspicions, I demurred. Over the past year, many friends entreated me again and again, yet I felt that with the first ever transfer of ruling power in 50 years of the Republic of China's jurisdiction over Taiwan, the new government ought to have the right to lay its own course. So, although I occasionally try to put pen to paper, I have never touched upon the question of this "axis."
On the first anniversary of the Chen Administration, as I consider the path that my country may take during the next three years, I must now painfully point out that, 1) the mainland policy axis of the Chen Administration this past year has been the "special state-to-state" formulation; 2) its implementation has virtually been by the book; 3) its surreptitious nature is similar to that of two years ago-only a handful of people are in on all of its details, it has not been subjected to public debate and possibly
（alas，again）not even to full discussion within the government; and 4) it has been more harmful to the national interest and public welfare than all the furor of two years ago. Simply put, the past year appears to be an extension of the "special state-to-state" formulation from two years ago, with only a change in some of the cast members. However, the script, director, and several other actors have not changed at all. The intervening election victory and change of ruling parties in retrospect appear to have been nothing more than an interlude.
A synopsis of the "special state-to-state" formulation
To explain how the "special state-to-state" formulation has been "implemented but not articulated" over the past year, I must first explain what the "special state-to-state" formulation is. Since I did not take part in the actual creation of the "special state-to-state" formulation, I have no way to understand the entirety of its conceptual framework, the profundity of its wording, or its possible "deep significance". So with this rudimentary understanding I shall roughly sketch out a synopsis of it. For the sake of credibility, I welcome those really in the know to come forth and clear up anything I may have misconstrued. As I understand it, studies pertaining to the "special state-to-state relationship" involve revision of the R.O.C. Constitution, foreign policy and mainland policy. I have been "fortunate" to be involved only with one of these areas, so I will only discuss the portion pertaining to mainland policy.
The question of cross-strait definition is the most valued aspect of the mainland policy portion in the "special state-to-state" formulation. The fundamental conceptualization of the distinguished minds behind the "special state-to-state" formulation is that Taiwan (and not the Republic of China) is a sovereign and independent country, whose sovereignty and jurisdiction (and not just jurisdiction) do not include the mainland, and whose people and territory only include Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu. In other words, the cross-strait relationship is not an internal political issue but an international relationship to which international laws and regulations apply. From this fundamental conceptualization, it follows that the "special state-to-state" formulation opposes the statement that "Taiwan is a part of China," which is the heart of Beijing's "one China principle." Therefore, Beijing's "one China" concept is unacceptable. The "special state-to-state" formulation also opposes the statement that "Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China." So, the KMT's version and the improved version that Beijing began to use last year are both unacceptable. Likewise, such formulations as "one China, with differing interpretations," "one China, namely, the Republic of China," "one country, two governments," "one country, two areas," "one divided China," and "one country, two equal political entities" are all unacceptable.
So, then what do we do about the cross-strait controversy over the definition of the "one China" concept? The framers of the "special state-to-state" formulation suggest that we "shelve the dispute and temporarily make no statements about it," or simply use the statement made by the DPP in its "Resolution on the Future of Taiwan" published in May 1999: "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country whose name is the Republic of China."
As for the future cross-strait ties, the "special state-to-state" formulation only offers a procedural explanation, namely, that Taiwan's future is to be decided by the people of Taiwan. Such terms as "democratic unification" or "unification" often used during the KMT era can no longer be used. They now stress the idea of "relationship," as in "the normalization of the cross-strait relationship," or use the ambiguous term "national development," or even, "integration along the lines of the European Union." In sum, "unification" as a goal has been diluted to the point that it is unrecognizable;and yet no alternative is offered.
Since the National Unification Guidelines mention "one China" and "unification," etc., they are the Devil incarnate, a cancer that naturally must be excised. The "special state-to-state" formulation advocates scrapping the National Unification Guidelines in favor of a set of Cross-strait Relationship Guidelines. If this cannot be done for the moment, then they need to be weakened by suspending all meetings of the National Unification Council, suspending all references to the National Unification Guidelines and their content, suspending any government publication containing the National Unification Guidelines, and most importantly, constantly stressing that the government has no predetermined stance regarding the future.
What shocked me most during the furor over the "special state-to-state" formulation was the attitude of certain relevant figures to certain problems. For example, they were not at all enthusiastic about Wang Daohan's visit, feeling that "the visit was about form more than substance," and it would be no great pity if it were cancelled. They felt that even if Beijing were to call off Mr. Wang's visit to Taipei, it would be worth it in comparison to the major strategic benefit of the "special state-to-state" formulation. By the same logic, we did not need to be in any hurry to engage in cross-strait talks, since the priority ought to be on consolidating our sovereign status.
What amazed me also was that cross-strait exchanges were likely to be criticized, especially visits back and forth by government officials, since these would confuse the public and blur the issue of who should be ideologically regarded as the foe.
Practice of the "special state-to-state" formulation
From the foregoing synopsis of the "special state-to-state" formulation, it isn't difficult to realize that the axis of the Chen Administration's mainland policy this past year has been nothing other than the "special state-to-state" formulation. But during President Chen's inauguration, he proposed a different strategic guiding principle, namely, to "make the U.S. satisfied, allow the international community to affirm, and leave the Chinese Communists with no excuse." Since the "special state-to-state" formulation was in direct conflict with the U.S. one-China "policy," and Beijing's one-China "principle," and had created such an enormous furor in 1999, it was best to hide it away, implementing but not articulating it.
Where is the "special state-to-state" formulation manifested? First and most importantly, there still remains the issue of national status. The proponents of the "special state-to-state" formulation eschew such terms as "one China," "one China, with differing interpretations," and "Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China." So up until now, despite the pains taken by opposition parties and the majority of scholars to offer advice, despite repeated exhortations by Mr. Ku Chen-fu and Lee Yuan-tze, despite Beijing's change in wording to "Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China," and even despite the parting suggestion of a U.S. official at the end of his term, the Chen administration remains oblivious. Once, in late June 2000, President Chen slipped up and mentioned "one China, with differing interpretations," while receiving foreign guests (as attested by members of the foreign delegation present). His remark was forcefully "clarified" by the Mainland Affairs Council (and not the spokesman at the Office of the President). There can be no other reason for this other than it involved a core concept.
Given the intense pressure from every quarter regarding the one-China issue, members of the Chen Administration have racked their brains for ways to avoid the matter. According to the "special state-to-state" formulation, one China issue is to be handled by "shelving disputes and temporarily offering no interpretations" on one-China. So once President Chen began his term of office, at the outset and on many occasions he brought up a new term "the spirit of 1992,"and defined it as "dialogue and exchanges, while shelving disputes." "Shelving disputes," (meaning not discussing "one-China," but directly resuming dialogue) was subsequently mentioned by officials at every level of the Administration, most recently on April 27 of this year, when Chairman Ku, representing the Chen Administration, read out a written statement on the eighth anniversary of the Koo-Wang talks. Other ways of avoiding the topic have included putting it off until the future (such as the phrase in President Chen's inaugural speech, "a future one-China"), foisting responsibility onto the other side of the Taiwan Strait (as in the Cross Party Task Force consensus to "respond to the one-China advocacy of the other side of the Strait), or bracketing it as an "agenda item" (now rarely heard), etc.
According to this core precept, the Cross Party Task Force worked out the perception that "neither the Republic of China nor the People's Republic of China is subordinate to, or represents, the other." Recently, Chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council Tsai Ying-wen raised the stakes with her demand that "the mainland authorities must acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China." Does she mean that we need the acknowledgement of the Chinese Communists before we exist? Should we then also acknowledge the existence of the People's Republic of China? If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were to accord mutual recognition, would that not mean they were two countries?
Regarding the future of cross-strait relations, based on the "special state-to-state" formulation, President Chen stressed before he began his presidency and after Premier Chang and Chairperson Tsai started their terms of service that "unification is not the only option," and "the future option is not preordained." At the start of the year, he brought out his "integration" proposal, but as of now no officials elaborate on its meaning, only reiterating that the future is not preordained. However, the English translation, "integration" was exactly the same as the integration concept in the "special state-to-state" formulation.
The National Unification Guidelines and National Unification Council, which are regarded as the main targets of the "special state-to-state" formulation, have only been dealt with in a perfunctory fashion over the past year. True to the "special state-to-state" formulation, no one has mentioned either the Guidelines or the Council over the past year, nor has anyone quoted anything from them, and of course, President Chen has not convened the National Unification Council. In August of last year, a certain high-level official at the Office of the President temporarily broached the subject, but this was quickly stamped out. Even publication of the datebooks of the Mainland Affairs Council annually provided to specialists and scholars has been stopped, reportedly because the text of the National Unification Guidelines was all there.
Even more serious, the Chen Administration's actions have gone beyond the conceptual framework of the "special state-to-state" formulation in two major situations. First, it denied that Taipei and Beijing ever reached an agreement in 1992. On this issue, the KMT and Chinese Communists have differed in their stances, but minimally, the KMT has always maintained that there was an agreement, and the Chinese Communists switched this past year from denying the existence of the agreement to acknowledging it. Who would have thought that once the DPP came to power it would not only insist upon negating the "one China, with differing interpretations" formulation, but would even deny from President Chen on down that there ever had been an agreement in 1992, only acknowledging a so-called "spirit of 1992." At the end of April last year as I was about to leave my official post, I coined the term, "1992 agreement" to help break the cross-strait stalemate, and suggested that there was no need to define it, hoping that the lack of definition would leave some room for ambiguity, since this would allow each side to maintain its own version (such as "one China, with differing interpretations," "one China," and "differing interpretations," or "varying interpretations of 'one China'"). It is a pity that the Chen Administration to this very day still continues to deny that there ever was a basic agreement. Think about it, if there never was an agreement, how could there be the "spirit of 1992"? If there never was an agreement in 1992, then how could there have been the Singapore talks in 1993? From 1995 to 2000, Beijing wasn't interested in holding further talks, so it switched from tacit acknowledgement to denial. Now Beijing switches back to acknowledging the agreement while the Chen Administration denies that it exists. I'm afraid that there is only one explanation for this and that is, the Chen Administration does not want to resume talks.
The second new action that goes further than the "special state-to-state" formulation is the denial by some government officials that they consider themselves Chinese. The late President Chiang Ching-kuo and former President Lee have both said, "I am Taiwanese and I am Chinese." My impression is that the "special state-to-state" formulation does not imply denial of being Chinese, so in fundamental nature it is relatively akin to the "two China" concept. However, this past year, some in the Chen Administration referred to themselves as Sinatic People (President Chen), "akin to Chinese," (Premier Chang), or to the statement, "If I were a professor, I would be willing to identify with being Chinese and Taiwanese," some (such as Chairperson Tsai) currently are unwilling to reply at all. Among the hundreds of major officials, it turns out no one is willing to openly refer to themselves as Chinese. This is no longer the "special state-to-state" formulation; I am afraid it verges upon "quasi-Taiwan independence."
The "special state-to-state" formulation attitude can also be seen in the way many specific problems are handled. For example, regarding a resumption of cross-strait talks, Chairperson Tsai declared to the Legislature in October of last year that, "a resumption of talks is not the only option for maintaining cross-strait stability." When the U.S. reached a decision at the end of April this year on the arms it would sell Taiwan, an unnamed high-level official immediately disclosed through a designated reporter that "we are in no hurry to resume talks this year." Insiders realize that the aforementioned negations of "one China," "one China, with differing interpretations," and "1992 agreement" are excellent ways to block any resumption of talks. Ignoring Beijing's relatively pragmatic statements (such as "Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China" from August last year) signals an intention to give it the cold shoulder. On the mini-link between Quemoy, Matsu and the mainland, the government has yet asked the Straits Exchange Foundation to send any messages to communicate even slightly with its counterpart on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Each of these demonstrates that the attitude of the ruling authorities in Taiwan toward resuming cross-strait talks is identical to their attitude toward Wang Daohan's proposed visit to Taipei two years ago, passive and unreceptive.
Among cross-strait exchange issues, the shooting down of Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh's plan to visit Xiamen last June has classic significance. Based on the "special state-to-state" formulation, a visit by Mayor Hsieh to visit Xiamen, or a visit by Xiamen Mayor Zhu Yayen to Kaohsiung would suffice to lower suspicions. And President Chen's Deputy secretary-general said in July of last year regarding Beijing's bid for the 2008 Olympics that, "we support Beijing's bid, but will not co-sponsor it with the Chinese Communists." This stance remains unchanged to this very day. Now, if that doesn't reflect a "special state-to-state" formulation mentality, then what does?
Impact of the "special state-to-state" formulation
On several occasions recently when President Chen assessed the track record of his government during its first year of rule, he cited the stability of cross-strait relations as one major accomplishment. This claim is only based on a narrow foundation; namely that "cross-strait" literally refers to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Although Taipei and Beijing did not resume talks the past year, it is indeed true that they did not go to war either, and economic and cultural relations have grown even closer. However, it is very clear that we (especially the President) cannot just refer to the two sides of the strait when discussing "cross-strait ties," since cross-strait ties directly affect our internal development and international relations, and have an enormous impact on the long-term direction of the nation.
The harm caused to our national interest and the public welfare by the Chen's Administration's "special state-to-state" formulation, with its pronounced "quasi-Taiwan Independence" tinge, far outweighs that of the "stated but not implemented 'special state-to-state' formulation" floated for three weeks two years ago. It has an impact in three areas:
First, it stirs up acrimonious relations between unification and independence supporters, and raises tensions over differences in provincial heritage. Based on the unique situation between Taiwan and the mainland and the composition of Taiwan's population, the issues of unification versus independence and provincial heritage touch upon the Republic of China's most sensitive political nerves. When the KMT was in power, as the nation's foremost major political party, it took the path of moderation, working to lessen disputes over the unification versus independence issue, and to alleviate differences over provincial heritage. Its fundamental conviction was that the unification versus independence issue would split Taiwan apart and foster unity on the mainland, while the question of democracy would split the mainland apart while fostering unity on Taiwan. So the KMT's grand strategy was to talk a great deal about democracy while saying little about unification versus independence. The National Unification Guidelines, the supreme guiding principle for mainland policy, may have had "unification" in their title, but they were not guidelines for the hurried pursuit of unification. They stressed democracy and freedom as fundamental premises and defined stages to the process. They could be termed guidelines for maintaining the current state of security and stability in the Taiwan Strait, the fundamental spirit of which is guided by the five decades of the Taiwan experience of "pursuing progress amidst stability." Unfortunately, the Chen Administration and Democratic Progressive Party completely ignore the National Unification Guidelines, and plot new coordinates for the nation. Although the Chen Administration is limited in power, and dares not immediately raise the flag of Taiwan Independence, only uttering negative statements pertaining to high-level issues (such as President Chen's "four noes and one not," Premier Chang's "five noes," and Chairperson Tsai's "four noes"), public unease about the future of the nation is nevertheless widespread. President Chen has gradually moved away from his "government of the people" concept in order to jockey for power, turning instead toward the manipulation of exclusionary nativist ideology the result of which will be to continue opening unification/independence and provincial heritage wounds. If this trend is not checked, sooner or later it will result in splitting Taiwan apart while fostering unity on the mainland.
The second explicit result is a loss of public confidence in the future, since members of the public can see cracks in the foundation on which the safeguards of national stability were based in the past, while the government obstinately refuses to state what the new foundation is. They witness the domestic political scene descending into a continuous joust for power in which unification/independence and provincial heritage factors are emotional components, and they see cross-strait ties, which originally lacked in mutual trust, atrophying further. Given the lack of public confidence in the future, in a society where production factors can move about freely, domestic investment will inevitably decline, and both talent and capital will flow elsewhere, inevitably slowing overall economic growth and exacerbating unemployment. These are unavoidable consequences. Although many symptoms are currently being manifested in the economic and financial sector, upon close examination, the cause of the malaise lies elsewhere.
Third, by placing the nation in a new state of strategic peril, national security and the public welfare will become more dependent on our relations with strong powers and the domestic politics there, factors which are clearly beyond our control. During the first two terms of former President Lee Teng-hui's presidency (1988-1996) Taiwan's economic development and democratization were strongly affirmed by the international community, and we were feeling our way toward a reconciliation in cross-strait ties, which was beneficial for our diplomatic situation. During the final term (1996-2000), Beijing engaged in saber rattling directed at us, and the U.S. gradually pulled away, tilting instead toward the mainland, which was deleterious to our diplomatic situation. Once the Chen Administration implemented a "special state-to-state" formulation mainland policy after May 20 of last year, one direct result was to raise cross-strait tensions. A second was that the Chen Administration had to increase our reliance on the United States to provide rescue. Compared to the previous administration of former President Lee, it is a case of "something gained, but at great expense." It has made it harder for us to escape the entanglements of Washington-Beijing ties, and has greatly increased the potential for one side or the other to play the "Taiwan card" or for us to become the focus of conflict during periods of tension between the two big powers. And since Taiwan's dependence on the U.S. "doing something" and on the Chinese Communists "not doing something" has increased, our future is more entangled than ever in their domestic political power games, and most worryingly, any potential change in the mainland domestic political situation. If the tendency of the Chen Administration to take the "special state-to-state" formulation path of integrating exclusionary nativist ideology, not only is there the danger that our country will be torn apart, but our external relations will encounter endless conflicts and instability.
Recommendations
The creators of the "special state-to-state" formulation have made several major errors. First, there was no through discussion within the government before it was brought forth, not only were members of the cabinet unaware of it, even several far-sighted major officials at the President's side were kept in the dark. This was a procedural mistake. Second, no complete assessment of its consequences was carried out beforehand. From what I learned later, their so-called assessment could at best be described as "naive." This was a mistake in reasoning. Third, once it resulted in disaster, none of the framers dared come forth to clean up the mess. And after the Straits Exchange Foundation and Mainland Affairs Council brought things back to the "one China, with different interpretations" position and the crisis had been averted, the creators of the formulation continued to snipe from the shadows. This was an ethical mistake.
Having gained power through a democratic and legal procedure, President Chen Shui-bian indeed has the right to implement policies he considers correct, including the "special state-to-state" formulation. But of course, his policies must be subject to the scrutiny of public opinion; this is a fundamental law of democracy. Today's problems stem not only from what the Chen Administration is doing, but from the fact that it is doing things without declaring what it is doing. To do without saying what you are doing is tantamount to operating surreptitiously, avoiding the proper scrutiny of a democratic society. This is very similar to what led to the "special state-to-state" formulation two years ago. The same cabal, with the addition of some new ones, is running things behind the scenes and not necessarily according to normal procedure. No one knows if they are as naive as two years ago in assessing Beijing's reaction. And no one knows if they bring about disaster once more whether they will once more demonstrate cowardice and shift responsibility to the entire public. As one who has been burned by them before, I am gravely worried.
Therefore, my first recommendation is that President Chen and the Chen Administration should clearly explain this major policy axis, not just putting it in negative terms, but stating it positively. President Chen should tell the entire public:
1) Whither does he want to take the nation? What is his vision of the future? He may "have a dream most beautiful," if so, what is his "dream"?
2) What method is he preparing to use to realize his vision of the future?
3)What is the possible process? What will the obstacles be?
4) What price must the public be prepared to pay for attaining this vision?
Given the importance of cross-strait relations, President Chen has not only a political responsibility to come clean, he has an ethical one as well. If he really feels that his policy is in the best interest of the welfare of the 22.3 million people of Taiwan, he should declare what it is. To implement an undeclared policy in this society of an informed and knowledgeable public, where discourse flourishes, is untenable and unsustainable for very long.
My second recommendation involves the identity of the Republic of China in the broader context. At the start of the 21st century, Chen Shui-bian, who refers to himself as a "son of Taiwan," is in fact very fortunate. As he leads the people of Taiwan, he stands at a fork in the long river of history. Will we enjoy long and sustainable peace and prosperity or head off into the shadows of war and economic decline? Shall we pursue ethnic integration or social disintegration? He has the power to choose. Leading Taiwan, he also stands at a crossroads between the international community and the Chinese mainland. Will Taiwan play the role of intermediary in the future, helping the international community enter the mainland and helping the people of the mainland get in tune with the world? Or will we function merely as a pawn, the focus of friction between the two, ultimately perhaps becoming a sacrificial lamb on the altar of bilateral conflict? He has the power to choose. There is no question that the choices and actions he takes in dealing with these issues will affect the future of every one of us.
Thus, I recommend that President Chen and every member of the Chen Administration think long and hard, and then think long and hard once more.
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